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Trivers and Willard (Science 179:90-92, 1973) predict that where investment by par- 
ents in good condition increases the fitness of sons more than that of their sisters, while 
the opposite is true of parents in poor condition, parents with much to invest will favor 
sons, while those with little will favor daughters. Patterns of parent-child association 
on Ifaluk atoll are consistent with this prediction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
G 
enerally, parents should have evolved to allocate resources ac- 
cording to offspring reproductive potential (see Fisher 1958, p. 
159). Trivers and Willard (1973) have suggested specifically that 
where, for a given amount of investment (Trivers 1972), sons in 
good condition will outreproduce their sisters, and daughters in poor con- 
dition will outreproduce their brothers, sons should be favored by parents 
with much to invest, and daughters by parents with little. Parents may ex- 
pend greater investment on the favored sex by biasing the sex ratio of their 
offspring, and/or by investing more in surviving offspring. 
Much evidence and discussion have been addressed to this prediction 
(Trivers and Willard 1973; reviews in Clutton-Brock and Albon 1982; Trivers 
1985). Some tentative evidence suggests that human parents may determine 
offspring sex before birth according to their ability to invest (see Clutton- 
Brock and Albon 1982; Trivers 1985). Better evidence suggests that humans 
invest differentially in children after birth. In some highly stratified human 
groups, male-biased sex ratios have been effected among high-status parents 
by female infanticide, abuse, and neglect (explicity predicted in Alexander 
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1974; evidence in Dickcmann 1979; Voland 1984, 1986; Boone 1986). And, 
both within and across cultures, high-status parents have been shown to 
disinherit daughters compared to their brothers (e.g., Dickemann 1979; Van 
den Berghe and Mesher 1980; Boone 1986). 
To date, observational evidence of a sex bias in investment in children 
according to parental condition has not been presented for humans; it is 




Ifaluk is an atoll encircling an area 0.939 statute miles square, lying at 7”15’ 
north latitude and 147” east longitude, about 350 miles east-southeast of the 
political center of the archipelago, Yap, and about 400 miles south of the 
nearest economic center, Guam. People.on Ifaluk continue to subsist almost 
entirely by fishing, breadfruit and coconut harvesting, and taro cultivation. 
Many aspects of Ifaluk’s culture, like its subsistence economy, were at the 
time of our study much as they had been traditionally (Burrows and Spiro 
1953; Bates and Abbott 1958; Lutz-1980; Turke 1985). 
The small land area of Ifaluk atoll is passed down by use: women, who 
work the land, share that right with their sisters, daughters, and grand- 
daughters. Similarly, women, their immediate families, and those of their 
sisters, daughters, and granddaughters, live together on bugot, the estates 
on which they work together to prepare food, weave together much of Ifa- 
luk’s material culture, and care for young children. Canoe houses and can- 
oes, individual coconut palms, and the vita1 and prestigious lore of navigators 
and master builders are, on the other hand, commonly used by, and con- 
sidered the property of, men. The latter two of these, at least, may be passed 
on from father to son. Public property, including pathways, island peri- 
pheries, large fishing seines, and the meeting house, are all “the property 
of the chiefs.” The single most important aspect of “property” on Ifaluk, 
and in this part of the Pacific, however, is that chiefs have the authority to 
determine how, and to what end, all of the resources on the atoll will be 
used, irrespective of their nominal “ownership” (see Burrows and Spiro 
1957, pp. 146-156; Alkire 1974). 
Status, then, may be the most important determinant of resource access 
on Ifaluk. Parents are differentiated by status in two ways. Traditionally, 
each clan is headed by a male chief, who inherits his rank from his mother’s 
brother; this system is still intact. There are now five clan chiefs on Ifaluk 
(one old woman shares that position for a lack of suitable male heirs), two 
local village chiefs, two chiefly “advisors,” and ten likely adult successors. 
(The greater number of successors than chiefs reflect uncertainty over 
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whether a brother or sister’s son will inherit.) Material benefits accrue to 
holders of chiefly office, including annual tribute offerings, a favorable bal- 
ance in house-to-house food sharing (which occurs at least once a week), 
extra fish at island-wide redistributions (which happen at least once a month), 
and a more leisurely life (Betzig 1986a). 
Since the post-war creation of the U.N. Pacific Trust Territories, a 
second kind of status has been created on Ifaluk, in the form of government- 
paid teaching, nursing, and construction positions. Thirteen native men are 
presently so employed on a full-time basis; four others have been paid part 
time; and eight others were once, but are no longer, paid. As the only other 
source of cash income on Ifaluk is by the sale of copra, at about $10 to $20 
per extended family household with each arrival of the field trip ship, the 
relative buying power of salaried individuals is substantial. Six of the thirteen 
present full-time positions are filled by sons or brothers of chiefs and pre- 
viously salaried men (Turke and Betzig 1985). Men of either traditional, 
chiefly status or modern, salaried status have significantly higher reproduc- 
tive success than do men lacking either kind of status (Turke and Betzig 
1985). 
In analysis that follows, observed associations among all parents resi- 
dent on the larger of Ifaluk’s two inhabited islets, Falalop, and their children, 
wherever resident on the atoll, are considered. This includes nine high-status 
fathers (three with traditional status, five presently or previously salaried, 
and one both), eight mothers with husbands of high status (two traditional, 
five salaried, one both), and 17 fathers and 19 mothers with neither traditional 
nor salaried status. 
Scan 
The amount of time parents spend with children has been considered a sig- 
nificant indicator of investment by Fisher (1958, pp. 158-159) and Trivers 
(1972); it is also a tractable measure. Data on parent-child associations were 
collected during an instantaneous scan study, made on a daily 1-2-hour 
circuit of Falalop islet over 48 consecutive days from September to Novem- 
ber 1983. On each circuit, identifications of all individuals associating in 
groups of two or more were recorded. Scans were begun at randomly de- 
termined half-hour intervals during daylight hours; as virtually all daytime 
activities on Ifaluk are done outdoors, and as the circuit covered the islet, 
every kind of activity done on Ifaluk was within sight of this walk (details 
in Betzig and Turke 1986). 
Because these were instantaneous, rather than extended, or focal, scans 
(Altmann 1974), we were unable to determine which individuals initiated 
associations. We would expect that, generally, approaches would more often 
be made by solicitors to bestowers of favors. Children generally fit into the 
former category, and parents into the latter. It also seems likely that on 
Ifaluk, as elsewhere, associations would be both more frequent and more 
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Table 1. Parent-Child Association by Parent’s Status and Child’s Sex 
Fathers 
Percent of parent-child 
associations with sons 
(4 
Mothers 
Percent of parent-child 
associations with sons 
(n) 
High Status Low Status 
Chiefs, 
Chiefs, Advisors, 
Advisors, and Ever-Salaried Successors, 
Successors Men and Salaried All Others 
67.7” 66. lb 67.7’ 36.6 
(65) (59) (99) (41) 
62.od 49.2’ 52.9f 34.3 
(71) (65) (104) (102) 
“-‘Significance values for differences in proportions of parent-child associations with sons between high- 
and low-status parents. 
’ Maximum likelihood ratio (MLR) = 9.9437, p = 0.0016; b MLR = 8.5761, p = 0.0034; L MLR = 11.4983, 
p = 0.0007; d MLR = 13.0188, p = O.OC03: ’ MLR = 3.6621, p = 0.0557;‘MLR = 7.2670. p = 0.0070. 
protracted where they served the interests of both parties, and that, in the 
case of a conflict of interest, they would more often take place at the dis- 
cretion of favor bestowers. This would be so regardless of who more often 
approached whom (cf. Fairbanks and McGuire 1985). 
RESULTS 
On Ifaluk, husbands of high traditional and salaried status and their wives 
do in fact associate significantly more often with sons than do parents without 
such status, who tend to associate more often with daughters. Table 1 shows 
strong biases in these associations consistent with Trivers and Willard’s 
prediction. Data on the productivity of members of each age sex category 
suggest that the net flow of investment on Ifaluk is down the generations at 
all ages (Turke 1985). Accordingly, associations between parents and chil- 
dren of all ages have been taken into account in Table 1. When associations 
between parents and children under 16 only are considered, results remain 
in each case in the predicted direction, but are not as strong. (For traditional 
vs. low-status fathers, MLR = 7.9206, p = 0.0049; for salaried vs. low status 
fathers, MLR = 6.4183, p = 0.0113; for traditional vs. low status mothers, 
MLR = 3.3770, p = 0.0661; for salaried vs. low status mothers, MLR = 
0.0987, p = 0.7534.) 
Table 2, which includes data for all of Ifaluk atoll, shows that virtually 
none of these biases are accountable to sex ratio. Figures in Table 2 are 
replicated in the scan sample group. (For high-status fathers, percent sons 
= 40.0 [n = 601; for low-status fathers, percent sons = 40.0 [n = 651; for 
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High Status Low Status 
Chiefs, 
Chiefs, Advisors, 
Advisors and Ever-Salaried Successors, 
Successors Men and Salaried All Others 
48.4 46.7 47.9 48.0 
(95) (105) (167) (150) 
51.3 49.0 51.0 46.8 
(78) (loo) (151) (222) 
high-status mothers, percent sons = 44.0 [n = 501; and for low-status moth- 
ers, percent sons = 42.3 [n = 771.)’ 
DISCUSSION 
Several alternatives to Trivers and Willard’s prediction might explain these 
findings. First, since on Ifaluk the frequency of mother-child, though not 
father-child, association decreases with the age of children (b = -2.7221, 
p = 0.0760 regressing dy on x), differences in children’s ages might explain 
the result. This is not the case. In fact, though there is no difference in sons’ 
ages (MLR = 0.4898, p = 0.921 l), high-status mothers tend to have younger 
daughters (MLR = 6.6499, p = 0.0839); this dampens what may be a 
stronger preference on the part of high-status mothers to associate with sons. 
It is also possible that unobserved association patterns differed from 
those seen. It seems unlikely, though, that when we weren’t watching, high- 
status parents associated preferentially with daughters and low-status par- 
ents with sons. It also seems unlikely that the quality of associations sys- 
tematically contradicted their frequency. “Quality” is, in this case, difficult 
to assess. We were, however, able to note that sons and daughters of all 
ages of high and low status are equally likely to be at work while associating 
with their parents. (Children are physically working during about 18% of 
these associations, and parents are working during about 57%.) And, in 4 
months of observation, we saw altogether only five agonistic interactions 
(cf. Lutz 1982), only one of which took place during an instantaneous scan, 
and involved a mother admonishing a small child to stay out of the water. 
’ A more concise analysis would have compared the mean rates of association with children 
(number of associations/number of daughters versus the same for sons) by parents in each of 
the status groups. In the majority of cases, however, parents had either no sons or no daughters, 
making calculation of such rates impossible by introducing zeros into denominators. Data were 
accordingly grouped as in Tables 1 and 2. Use of the instantaneous scan technique should have 
randomized observations on individuals with respect to whether or not they behaved in the 
expected way. 
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Unless a higher proportion of parental investment was consistently conveyed 
when parents spent less time with their children, Trivers and Willard’s pre- 
diction is consistent with these results. 
Finally, information on another essential investment component, the 
flow of resources (Fisher 1958; Trivers 1972), would be an important sup- 
plement. It may be unreasonable, though, to assume that association fre- 
quency does not coincide with resource flow. Members of Ifaluk households 
that share food with one another (Betzig and Turke, A.d.), for example, 
associate significantly more often than members of households that do not 
(t = 2.033, p = 0.0447). Orientation has been used in a number of studies 
as an indicator of willingness to help (e.g., Chagnon and Bugos 1979; Hames 
1979; Seyfarth and Cheney 1984). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At this point, Trivers and Willard’s seems the best explanation for the ob- 
served bias in association patterns. Although the literature on human in- 
vestment patterns, including residence and inheritance, is vast (e.g., Rad- 
cliffe-Brown and Forde 1950; Schneider and Gough 196 1; Goody 1976), none 
of it that we are aware of predicts or explains this complex of association 
preferences with sons and daughters dependent upon parental status. 
Evidence from 104 societies suggests that in matrilineal, as well as pa- 
trilineal, societies, the reproductive success of high-status sons exceeds that 
of their sisters (Betzig 1986b). And, in all human societies, parental condition 
can have important effects on both sons’ and daughters’ reproductive po- 
tential, irrespective of rules of residence (cf. Altmann 1980; Silk 1983; Fair- 
banks and McGuire 1985). This suggests that the pattern of investment de- 
scribed here probably has been adaptive in both kinds of societies 
historically. Whether or not it is presently on Ifaluk remains an interesting 
question.* One tentative suggestion that it might be comes from the obser- 
vation that chiefs and salaried men successfully affect the probability, pos- 
sibly in part by spending more time with them, that their sons get repro- 
ductively beneficial salaried jobs (Turke and Betzig 1985). 
Present patterns of parent-child association on Ifaluk may be consistent 
with the prediction that high-status parents will favor sons, because such a 
pattern has been adaptive over the course of evolutionary history (see Sy- 
mons 1979, 1985), or because it is adaptive presently (see Alexander 1979, 
1985), or both. Human historical evidence, suggesting that high-status sons 
generally have outreproduced their sisters, is consistent with the first; and 
the evidence that Ifaluk chiefs, possibly by association with their sons, now 
help them get reproductively beneficial salaried jobs, is consistent with the 
last. 
’ We hope eventually to be able to address this question accurately by obtaining complete 
genealogical data of greater depth. 
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But we must note that the inheritance of chiefly status on Ifaluk from 
a mother’s brother, rather than from a father, appears to be inconsistent 
with both the present pattern of parent-child association, and with Trivers 
and Willard’s prediction. Though this form of inheritance has not been the 
rule in human societies, neither is Ifaluk an isolated case (e.g., Murdock 
1972). The African Gold Coast Ashanti, for example, are even more enig- 
matic; kings kept to themselves up to thousands of women, and when they 
died bequeathed that right to their sister’s sons (Rattray 1927). Presumably, 
a man with sufficient power to attract more women than anyone else might 
have more of what it takes to keep them, at very least the heir producers 
among them, from cuckolding him. Some evidence supports this assertion 
(Dickemann 1981; Betzig 1986b), and so contradicts the hypothesis that ma- 
trilineal inheritance may be associated with or caused by low confidence of 
paternity (e.g., Alexander 1974; Gaulin and Schlagel 1980; Flinn 1981). That 
a social position associated with reproductive privilege is ever given by a 
man to his sister’s son, rather than to his own, remains to us one of the 
striking incongruities between Darwinian theory and the evidence from 
human societies. 
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